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Abstract
This paper studies the transition of contract enforcement institutions. The preva-
lence of relational contracts, low legal quality, strong cultural preference for personalistic
relationships, low social mobility, and highly unequal endowment form a cluster of mu-
tually reinforcing institutions that hinder economic development. The cultural element
per se does not necessarily reduce social welfare though it may slow down the legal
development, while the real problem lies in endowment inequality and low social mobil-
ity. Thus a more equal distribution of resources may be the ultimate key to unravel the
above interlocking institutions. These results are generally consistent with the empirical
evidence.
JEL: O1, K49, C72.
Key Words: relational contract, legal contract enforcement, institutions, endowment
inequality, economic development.
1 Introduction
Whether an economy can sustain long run economic growth depends to a large extent on
whether its agents can achieve collectively e¢ cient outcomes through voluntary exchanges.
To this end, both informal relational contracts and formal legal ones may provide e¤ective
enforcement to facilitate cooperation. Though these two enforcement formats coexist in
many societies for most times (Ellickson 1991, Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004), the prevalence
90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Email: huang@smu.edu.sg. Tel.: 65-68280859. Fax: 65-
68280833. I thank Joel Sobel for useful comments. This paper is supported by a research grant from
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of formal impersonal enforcement is often associated with developed western economies,
while the heavy reliance on personalistic relationships with developing countries (Fafchamps
2002, McMillan and Woodru¤ 1999, Johnson et al. 2002). The transition from personal
to impersonal contract enforcement is thus deemed important for economic development.
The question not well understood is why some countries succeeded in making the transition
while others failed.
Some studies suggest a strong cultural preference for loyal personal relationships and
hence for relational contracts may be a cause of underdevelopment. For example, North
(1991) argues that one reason for the economic stagnation of Latin America is the prevalence
of personalistic relationships, which induce despotism, corruption, and ine¢ ciency. He
further demonstrates this using detailed evidence (North et al. 2000). A similar view is
advanced by Greif (1994, 2000, 2005) who compares di¤erent contract enforcement methods
in various societies. The causal view, however, is di¢ cult to reconcile with the experiences
of recently developed Asian economies under Confucian culture, namely Japan, Korean,
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. But if the presence of such a culture per se may not
necessarily inhibit economic development, then what does? And how does one explain the
correlation?
To answer these questions, this paper builds a simple model on how a societys contract
enforcement institutions evolve. The results suggest the inequality in resource distribution
may be the fundamental cause of slow legal development and economic backwardness. When
there is huge inequality in the distribution of initial endowment among agents, a society is
likely to experience a cluster of mutually reinforcing institutions including a strong cultural
preference for personalistic relationships, poor legal development, prevalence of relational
contracts, and low social mobility. Latin America seems to t into this category. When
the endowment is relatively equal, the cultural preference alone does not necessarily reduce
the overall welfare, though it may slow down the legal development process since relational
contracts have larger relative advantages in such a cultural environment, and it would grad-
ually become weaker as legal quality improves. The East Asian countries mentioned above
seem to be appropriate examples. The western developed economies, with relatively equal
endowment and individualistic culture, are the implicit benchmark case, whose transition
to impersonal enforcement is the fastest. These results show that di¤erent societies are
likely to have di¤erent contract enforcement institutions whose legal, social, and cultural
aspects constitute a coherent interrelated system(Greif 1997).
The intuition is as follows. Relational contracts secure cooperation by promising future
gains in an established relationship, which becomes easier when people share a stronger
cultural preference for loyalty. But then people are more reluctant to do business with new
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partners even though they are more productive than the old ones. By contrast, impersonal
legal contracts use a third party, the legal court, to deter cheating. When the legal quality
is higher, it is less costly to form new partnerships and hence people are more likely to
break up old, less productive partnerships.1 This implies those who continue to engage
in persistent relationships must have more productive partnerships and rely less on the
legal system. The relative usage of relational versus legal contracts in a society is thus
determined by the legal quality, the cultural preference, and how productive the established
partnerships are relative to the new ones.
To improve contract enforcement e¢ ciency, agents can improve legal system or cultivate
cultural tastes for loyalty, both of which are useful to deter cheating and facilitate coopera-
tion, and thus are substitutes for each other. When the distribution of projects in a society
is such that more agents adopt persistent partnerships, the loyalty culture tends to be more
widely cultivated, and hence people have less gain from improving legal quality. In such a
case, a slow legal development may still be the social optimal choice.
Problems may arise when high income agents who engage in persistent relationships,
labeled the elites, wield dominant political power so that relevant institutions are shaped
to their wish. This is more likely to happen when the endowment distribution is highly
unequal.2 Since the elites have much less incentive to improve the overall legal quality, the
investment in legal system under elite ruling is necessarily lower than the social optimal
level. Responding to the lower legal quality, agents have to use relational contracts more
often, and thus they would invest more in the cultural preference for loyalty. But this further
reduces the incentives to improve legal quality. In such a society, we often observe low social
mobility and non-democratic political scheme which preserve the privileges of the elites, as
well as an incompetent legal system, a strong personalistic culture, and the prevalence
of relational contracts, which together stagnate economic development and make it easier
to maintain the elite ruling. Since these social, political, legal, and cultural elements are
reinforcing each other, they form an organic system of contract enforcement institutions that
may be di¢ cult to change by piecewise reforms. The ultimate cure for all these symptoms
of underdevelopment, however, may lie in policies that make the initial distribution of
endowment more equal and increase social mobility.
The paper contributes to the literature by providing a formal analysis of how contract
1Johnson, McMillan and Woodru¤ (2002) provide empirical evidence consistent with these results: Trust
in existing suppliers may make entrepreneurs reluctant to purchase from new suppliers. ... The development
of legal institutions brings indirect e¢ ciency gains, by lowering entry barriers, in addition to direct e¢ ciency
gains through strengthening condence in contracts.
2When the endowment is more evenly distributed, it is di¢ cult for a few elites to maintain dominance,
and hence institutions are developed to reect, to a larger extent, the aggregate social welfare.
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enforcement institutions evolve over time and di¤er across societies. In a related study,
Greif (2005) proposes a similar conceptual framework where markets and political institu-
tions coevolve through a dynamic interplay between contract enforcement institutions and
coercive constraint institutions. That paper has a vast coverage of relevant issues, which
are di¢ cult to be hammered into a formal model. Another closely related study is Sobel
(2006); a version of its basic model is adopted in the current paper to analyze the com-
parative advantages of di¤erent enforcement institutions. Li (2003) also briey compares
informal relational contracts with formal legal institutions in the context of East Asian mir-
acles and crisis. Dixit (2003) explores how the relative advantage of an informal multilateral
enforcement versus external enforcement changes as trade expands. None of these studies
endogenizes the legal quality.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, a repeated matching game is analyzed,
which provides the micro foundation for studying the transition from relational to legal
contracts in section 3. Some implications and evidence are discussed in section 4. The nal
section concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Basic Model: Relational versus Legal Contracts
2.1 The Model Setup
There is a continuum of agents. They are originally randomly matched to play a two-player
repeated game. In each period, a match continues if both players agree to participate,
and it breaks up if either one wishes so. A match can be either fresh or stale. In a fresh
match, agents play the prisoners dilemma described below, where the standard conditions
b > a > 0; d > 0; and 2a > b   d are assumed. A match is always fresh in the initial
period; in each period afterwards while the match is not broken up, it remains fresh with
probability , and it becomes stale with probability 1  : Stale matches remain so as long
as the match continues, providing a payo¤ l 2 [0; a] to both players in each period.
cooperate defect
cooperate (a; a) ( d; b)
defect (b; d) (0; 0)
There is no information transmission across matches. Agents know the quality of their
current match, the past actions of their own and their partners within the match. They
cannot access information about the past actions of any other agents. Since the population
of agents is large, we neglect the possibility that any two agents have met before. Unmatched
agents can nd a new partner without cost.
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In each period of a fresh match, an agents strategy species an action in the above
PD game followed by a decision of whether to continue or break the partnership. In a
stale match, agents only need to consider the latter decision. Agents choose strategies to
maximize the discounted sum of their stage-game payo¤s, net of contracting costs if any,
where the common discount factor is  2 (0; 1): The paper focuses on subgame perfect
equilibrium outcomes, where an agent discontinues a partnership only if doing so gives him
a better payo¤ than otherwise.
In particular, we study two types of enforcement institutions that enable agents to
cooperate. One is an informal relational contract where players spend the rst several
periods of a relationship getting the reservation utility 0 and then start cooperating. By
refraining from getting higher payo¤s in the initial periods, players are essentially building
up their relationship that can stand against future cheating. When players do not break up
even when the match becomes stale, they are in an informal persistent (IP) relationship;
when they do break up, they are in an informal good-weather (IG) relationship since they
stay together only when the match is fresh.
The other type of enforcement is to sign a formal legal contract mandating cooperation
starting from the rst period of a match. If a pair of players each takes cost c to write
a contract, the court identies cheating when it occurs with probability Q(c; q); where q
denotes the general quality of the legal system. Assume Qc; Qq > 0; Qcc; Qqq  0; and
Qcq  0: When a cheating is veried by the court, each agent gets zero payo¤. Depending
on whether to continue or break up in a stale match, agents can choose between a formal
persistent (FP) contract and a formal good-weather (FG) contract respectively. These four
varieties of relationships are summarized in the following table.
Persistent match
(continue when stale)
Good-weather match
(break up when stale)
Informal relational contract IP IG
Formal legal contract FP FG
The timing of this stage game can be summarized as follows. Players randomly pair with
each other. Subject to mutual agreement, partners choose a relationship among the four
options IP, IG, FP, and FG, and then behave accordingly. A match breaks up automatically
once an unexpected cheating is detected. Players exiting from an old relationship then
randomly form new matches and the same action sequence described above follows. The
sections below show these contracts are indeed subgame perfect equilibrium, and analyze
how agents adopt di¤erent contracts.
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2.2 Informal Relational Contracts IP and IG
When there is no cheating problem so that players can start cooperating from the rst
period of a match, each player gets a value of VP = a+ [VP + (1  )l] from a persistent
relationship IP, where l = l1  is the discounted payo¤ of a stale match, and the subscript
P denotes a persistent relationship. Solving VP we get
VP =
a+ (1  )l
1   ; (1)
which is achieved in IP after certain periods of costly relationship building. Note VP in-
creases in l. The value of cooperation in a good-weather relational contract IG, VIG, how-
ever, does not dependent on l since players break up when the match is stale. Accordingly,
the relationship building cost in IG is also di¤erent from that of IP. The choice between
these two relational contracts IP and IG is determined by their net payo¤s V0P and V0G,
respectively, as proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (i) There exists a unique l such that players choose IP if l > l, IG if l < l,
and are indi¤erent between IP and IG when l = l, where
l  a  b(1  )

: (2)
(ii) The value and relation-building cost of IP and IG are, respectively,
V0P  VP   cIP = l + (1  )l
1   ; (3)
cIP =
a  l   (1  )l
1   ; (4)
V0G  VIG   cIG = l; (5)
cIG =
b  a

; (6)
where l  l1  : Both V0G and cIG are independent of l, while V0P > V0G and cIP < cIG
hold for any l > l:
Since a persistent relationship will continue even when the match goes stale, the contin-
uation value of IP increases in l, and hence it needs a lower relationship-building cost cIP
to achieve cooperation when l is higher. So cIP decreases in l: In contrast, the cost cIG in
IG does not depend on l, and it equals cIP only when l = l. That is, when l < l a stale
match is so unproductive that it is better to break it up and meet a new partner, which
is exactly the arrangement of an IG. So cIG = b a is the highest cost and V0G = l is the
lowest return for using these two relational contracts. See gures 1 and 2 for illustration.
6
0 a
*
1
a lr
dr
-
-
b a
dr
-
legal cost in FP
Gc
Pc
IPc
Gl*l l
legal cost in FG
hl
IGc
relational cost in IP
relational cost in IG
Figure 1: The relationship between legal contract costs and relationship building costs
2.3 Formal Legal Contracts FP and FG
Suppose there exists a legal system to enforce formal contracts. We investigate agents
choices between legal contracts FP and FG to achieve cooperation. The results are proved
in the following lemma and illustrated in gures 1 and 2.
Lemma 2 (i) The minimum legal cost is cG in a formal good-weather contract FG, and cP
in a formal persistent contract FP. Players stay in a stale match when the legal contract
cost is above cS = a l1  . The threshold costs cG, cP and cS are determined by, respectively,
bQ(cG; q) + cG = b  a; (7)
bQ(cP ; q) + cP = cIP ; (8)
where @cG@q <
@cP
@q < 0,
@2cG
@q2
; @
2cP
@q2
> 0; @cP@l < 0, and
@cG
@l = 0.
(ii) For any legal quality q, there exists a unique lG such that players choose FP if l > lG,
FG if l < lG, and are indi¤erent between FP and FG when l = lG, where
lG = a  (1  )cG (9)
and it is increasing and concave in q: The net value of FG,
VG   cG = lG
1    lG; (10)
is independent of l, while the net value of FP, VP   cP , strictly increases in l:
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Figure 2: The values of contracts IG, FG, IP, and FP at some q > q
The intuition is as follows. cG and cP are the minimum costs of using legal contracts FG
and FP, respectively, to enforce cooperation starting from the rst period of a match. Using
legal contracts becomes cheaper when the legal quality improves, which is why both cG and
cP decrease in q. Whether to break up or continue a stale match again depends upon how
productive the stale match is. When the productivity l is higher, players need less outside
incentive to continue their relationship. So cP decreases in l while cG is independent of
it, where the two are equal when l = lG(q) given any legal quality q. Actually lG is the
threshold productivity level around which the ranking of FG and FP also changes. Note
when the legal quality q is higher, lG is higher so that FG becomes more widely used and
its return lG is also higher.
2.4 Choices between Relational and Legal Enforcement
The above analysis shows that players with higher productivity l are more likely to establish
persistent relationships in both relational and legal contracts, and the legal contracts are
adopted more often when the quality of legal system is higher. The optimal choice among
the four contract options turns out to depend on both l and q.
Since the threshold productivity level lG strictly increases in legal quality q while l is
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independent of it, there exists a unique q where these two coincide:
lG(q) = l:
But this condition implies, together with results in Lemma 2, cG(q) = cP (l; q) = b a =
cIG: That is, when q = q, the legal cost cG is exactly equal to the highest relational cost
cIG. In this case Q(cIG; q) = 0 and it does not matter whether cheating is detected, since
the contract cost cIG itself is already high enough to forbid any cheating. Since l = lG
means indi¤erence between FP and FG, l = l means indi¤erence between IP and IG, and
lG(q) = l means indi¤erence between FG and IG, players with l are indi¤erent among
all four types of contracts under legal quality q. So (l; q) is the common point where the
four contracts meet. See gure 3 for illustration.
Since a persistent relationship yields the same maximum value VP , the choice between
IP and FP depends on which is cheaper to enforce. For any q > q, dene lh such that
players are indi¤erent between IP and FP:
cP (lh; q) = cIP (lh), lh = a  l   (1  )cP
1   : (11)
So projects with l > lh would continue to use IP until the legal quality is above q, which
is determined by (11) when lh = a: The detailed choices among the four types of contracts
are proved in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 When q  q, players use IG if l  l; and IP if otherwise. When q > q,
players use FG if l  lG, FP if l 2 (lG; lh]; and IP if l > lh and q  q. Players in the
boundary cases are indi¤erent between alternative choices. lh is increasing and concave in
q, where lh = l = lG at q = q, and lh > lG at q > q.
In summary, when the quality of legal system is high enough (q > q), the informal con-
tracts are replaced by formal legal contracts for all good-weather relations and for persistent
ones except those with the most productive stale matches (l > lh). And FG becomes more
popular than FP as the legal quality q increases, which increases the values of the bottom
projects that su¤er large negative productive shocks when a match goes stale.3 The usage
of FP, however, will not disappear as long as the legal cost is positive; actually only at the
limit case where cG = cP = 0 and lG = a, FP stops to be used.
It is obvious that the gain from a better legal system di¤ers across projects. Players
with the most productive projects l > lh rely exclusively on informal persistent relationships
3Actually, the average income goes up and the income inequality goes down when the legal quality q is
higher, since all players using FG get the same income lG which increases in q, and the proportion of players
adopting FG also increases in q.
9
0 a
FG FP
IPIG
q
*l l
Gl hl
q
*q
Figure 3: Optimal contracts dependent on project productivity l and legal quality q
rather than formal legal contracts, who thus do not benet from a better legal system as
long as the legal quality is below q. Players with l 2 (lG; lh] use formal legal contracts to
maintain persistent relationships and hence are better o¤ with higher legal quality, but less
so than the bottom players with the least productive projects l  lG who rely exclusively
on the legal system for contract enforcement. So in general, those with high l projects rely
more on informal and persistent relationships and hence have less to gain from an improved
legal system.
2.5 The E¤ects of Cultural Preference
Suppose there exists a cultural preference that gives each player a psychological payo¤
  0, in addition to the material payo¤ l; in each period one stays in a stale match. Since
it also reduces the relation-building cost in a persistent relationship, more agents would
use it relative to good-weather ones. The detailed adjustment of the basic model to  is
summarized by the following corollary.
Corollary 1 When there is a cultural preference  for persistent relationships, the rele-
vant payo¤s and costs for good-weather matches do not change, while those for persistent
relationships are changed in the way that l is replaced by l+, where  @
2cP
@q@ < 0: The thresh-
olds l; lG and lh are each reduced by  so that more projects use informal and persistent
relationships.
10
3 Investment in Legal Quality
We are now in a position to endogenize the quality of legal system and study how contract
enforcement institutions may evolve from relational contracts to the increasing usage of
legal contracts. Suppose there are innite generations of agents. Each generation lives one
period and each agent brings up one child. Players are homogeneous in all aspects except
l; the productivity of a stale match that indicates the quality of project.4 The distribution
of l in the population follows F () and remains the same for all generations. When a
match between players with projects li and lj goes stale, its productivity is  li + (1  )lj ,
where  2 (0; 1). Given that l is observed ex ante and there is no searching cost, perfectly
assortative matching will happen where a player forms a match only with somebody who
has the same l. We assume there are enough agents for each l so that the possibility of two
agents meeting more than once can still be ignored.5
1
Legal quality
 is chosen
given , , and .
t
t t
q
q ka
+
In a mobile society, randomly draw a project .l
Social mobility
policy for 1
is determined.
t +
1
Players match,
choose a contract
given , , .tl q a+
In an immobile society, inherit the parent's project .l
Projects are
allocated by
social mobility
policy.
Generation t Generation 1t +
Figure 4: The timeline of legal investment
The time line of legal development is illustrated in gure 4. In the initial generation,
projects are randomly assigned to agents; the subsequent allocation of projects in every
generation t+ 1 follows the social mobility policy determined by the previous generation t.
For simplicity we only consider two mobility choices: a mobile society policy under which
each agent randomly draws a project l  F (), and a rigid society policy where the project
is inherited from the parent. The interest group who has the dominant economic power
4Presumably, one can also model heterogeneity of b; a, and  among agents. l is chosen mainly because
of its crucial role in the choice of di¤erent contract enforcement formats. Furthermore, it can be interpreted
as individual human capital or some valuable asset that can be inherited across generations, while the other
elements are more likely to fall beyond the control of individuals.
5For example, l may take only nite number of values.
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gets its favorite policy implemented.
Then the legal quality qt+1 is chosen to maximize the joint welfare of the immediate
children in the dominant interest group, if there is conict of interests.6 The cost function
of legal investment is C(qt+1; qt)k 1t ; where C1 > 0; C2 < 0; C11 > 0; and C12  0.
Technological conditions that may a¤ect the cost of improving legal quality are captured
by kt, which is exogenously determined and increasing over time. The initial legal quality
is zero so that all agents use informal relational contracts in the beginning.
When generation t + 1 grows up and replaces the old one, each player draws a project
randomly from the distribution if in a mobile society, or inherits the parents project if in
a rigid society. Then they play a reduced form of the matching game in the basic model,
where one gets a payo¤ V0P ; VP   cP ; V0G; or VG   cG if the chosen contract is IP, FP, IG,
and FG respectively, taking as given qt+1 and :7 Then they decide on the social mobility
policy and the legal quality for the next generation t+ 2, and the same sequence of choices
as above is repeated.
3.1 The Benchmark: Legal Development in a Mobile Society
In the benchmark case of a mobile society, the allocation of projects is random in all
generations. Since children of the same cohort have the same expected welfare, there is no
conict of interests regarding the public investment in legal quality, which coincides with
the social optimal choice.
Since a low quality legal system is too costly to be useful, a society will not start its
legal development process until it can establish one with high enough quality qt+1 > q.
Then based on Proposition 1, we can calculate the aggregate values of using FG, FP, and
IP, which are, respectively,
FG(qt+1) = F (lG;t+1)(VG;t+1   cG;t+1);
FP (qt+1) =
Z lh;t+1
lG;t+1
(VP   cP;t+1)dF (l);
IP (qt+1) =
Z a
lh;t+1
(VP   cIP )dF (l):
6Allowing more forward-looking in the model does not seem to a¤ect the main qualitative results, since
the driving force remains the same. This will become clear in the analysis below.
7This assumption can be justied as follows. Suppose in each sub-period all players in the same cohort
die with probability 1  , and they get zero payo¤ in the dying sub-period; this will give us the same results
derived above if the original discount factor is set to one. Before they die, decisions on social mobility and
legal investment are made for the next generation.
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The collective objective function of parents in generation t is
max
qt+1
FG(qt+1) + FP (qt+1) + IP (qt+1)  C(qt+1; qt)k 1t :
The optimal solution is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal legal quality qt+1 in a mobile society is uniquely determined
by
1  
1  
 @cG;t+1
@qt+1
F (lG;t+1) +
Z lh;t+1
lG;t+1
 @cP;t+1
@qt+1
dF (l) C1(qt+1; qt)k 1t  0; = 0 if qt+1 > q:
The legal development starts later and the legal quality qt+1 is lower when l is smaller and
when the cultural preference  is stronger.
So the legal development process starts only when the net gain of establishing legal
contract enforcement becomes larger than exclusively using relational contracts. The devel-
opment is slower in a society where initially more players engage in persistent relationships
(i.e., l is smaller); such a situation tends to arise when the market and technological changes
are little so that productivity shocks are milder. Similarly, since the marginal gain of im-
proving legal system also decreases in the cultural preference  (due to  @
2cP
@q@ < 0), the
overall legal development is slowed down by ; the aggregate welfare, however, is not nec-
essarily lower because the values of persistent relationships FP and IP strictly increase
in  while FG does not change.
3.2 Late Legal Development in a Rigid Society
When there is no mobility, the conicts over legal development are between three groups:
The IP group prefers zero investment in legal quality since @cIP@q = 0, and the FP group
prefers less investment than the FG group since @( cG)@q >
@( cP )
@q > 0. Given that a rigid
society policy has been chosen, the joint economic power of the IP and FP group must
dominate that of FG (see Proposition 4). Since players in the dominant group have less
gains from legal development, a rigid society tends to have inferior legal quality compared
with the social optimal level that prevails in a mobile society. In specic, suppose the legal
quality qt+1 is chosen in every generation t to maximize the welfare of the dominant groups
immediate children.8 The collective objective function is thus
max
qt+1
FP (qt+1) + IP (qt+1)  C(qt+1; qt)k 1t :
Since the interests of FG group, who benets most from a higher legal quality, are ignored
in the legal investment decision, the legal development of a rigid society is severely delayed.
8The within-group conicts among IP and FP players would not a¤ect the qualitative results.
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Proposition 3 The rigid society starts to invest in legal system at a later period, and in
every period its legal quality qEt+1 is also lower, compared with the social optimal solution in
the mobile society.
3.3 Endogenous Social Mobility Policy
As the above analysis shows, why some societies have embarked on an optimal legal devel-
opment path while others failed may depend crucially upon how the social mobility policy
is chosen, which is subject to huge conict of interests among players.
In a mobile society, all players in generation t+ 1 earns the same expected payo¤
E(Vt+1) =
(
V0GF (l) +
R a
l V0PdF (l) if q

t+1  q;
FG(q

t+1) + FP (q

t+1) + IP (q

t+1) if q

t+1 > q:
In a rigid society, a players payo¤ V (l; qEt+1) is determined by his parents project l and
the legal quality qEt+1. Players in generation t who own superior projects with V (l; q
E
t+1) 
E(Vt+1) naturally prefer the rigid society policy in order to preserve their privileges for their
children, while others prefer the mobile society policy. These are the two relevant interest
groups concerning social mobility policy. For convenience, the high income group is labeled
the elites. If the elites have enough economic power to secure dominant political power, the
society is said under elite-ruling where the elitesfavorite mobility policy, the rigid one, will
be chosen. If not, we are back to the benchmark case of a mobile society.9
Let le;t denote the lowest productivity of projects owned by elites in generation t. It is
uniquely determined by
V (le;t; q
E
t+1) = E(Vt+1): (12)
When qEt+1  q, le;t > l must be true because projects with l  l earn an identical
payo¤ l that is the lowest among all projects; similarly, le;t > lG;t holds when qEt+1 > q.
So le;t > maxfl; lG;tg is always true and the endogenously formed elites engage only in
persistent relationships.
Proposition 4 At any generation t; agents with projects l  le;t prefer the rigid society
policy while others prefer the mobile society policy, where le;t > maxfl; lG;tg: The rigid
policy is more likely to be adopted when
R a
le;t
ldF (l) is larger, when  is higher, and when qt
is lower under broad conditions.
This proposition shows a society is more likely to have low mobility and elite ruling when
its distribution of projects is highly unequal, when its cultural preference for persistent
9A more general model would allow a larger range of social mobility policies. But as long as elites prefer
less mobility than the mass, similar qualitative results will follow.
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relationship is strong, and when the legal system is less developed. So there is a two-
way reinforcing relationship between elite ruling and slow legal development: Elite ruling
directly leads to inferior legal quality (proposition 3), which reinforces the elite ruling by
increasing the relative economic power of those favoring the rigid society policy. Similarly,
a society with highly unequal initial endowment tends to have elite ruling, which in turn
helps preserve the inequality through low social mobility and ine¤ective legal systems. All
of these ine¢ cient institutions can be further reinforced by a personalistic culture.
Though cultures are slow moving institutions, they may still, at least to some extent,
respond to incentives. Since players in persistent relationships IP and FP get higher payo¤s
when  is higher, they may also nd it benecial to cultivate the cultural preference ,
especially when improving the legal quality is too costly. Since the elites are composed
exclusively by agents using IP and FP who prefer a stronger cultural preference than the
average player in a mobile society, the endogenous culture Et+1 under elite ruling tends to
be stronger than the social optimal level t+1, both of which are likely to be higher when
more players engage in persistent relations and when the legal quality is lower because
@( @cP@ )=@q < 0. That is, a less developed legal system induces agents to invest more in 
to enhance contract enforcement. So there exists a mutual reinforcing relationship between
a stronger personalistic culture and elite ruling/low social mobility as well as lower legal
quality.
In summary, there is a high correlation between low legal quality, strong cultural pref-
erence for personalistic relationships, and low social mobility plus elite ruling. Since these
conditions are reinforcing each other, the high inequality in the initial endowment distribu-
tion may act as the ultimate driving force for these cultural, political, and legal institutions,
which then in turn preserve the inequality (see gure 5). This implies that small di¤erences
in the initial conditions may perpetuate into vastly di¤erent clusters of institutions, which
set societies into diverging development paths.
4 Discussions and Relevant Evidence
The paper shows that relational contracts are more widespread when the legal system is of
low quality and high cost, when the cultural preference for personalistic relations is high,
when there are elite ruling and low social mobility, and when the income inequality is
high. The most salient example seems to be Latin America where all these elements are
observed simultaneously. The high cost of using the legal system in Peru forced governing
exchange by informal means, where 48% of the economically active population operates in
the informal sector (De Soto 1989, p. 131), and business people invest time, e¤ort, and
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Figure 5: The mutual-reinforcement among political, cultural, and legal conditions
money in cultivating long-term friendships. Informal employment in urban populations in
various Latin American countries averaged about 30% in 1989 (Portes 1994, p. 438).
The cultural and political roots of such a situation go back to the colonial era under the
Spanish empire, which are best summarized by North et al. (2000):
The Spanish and British carried their governance systems for political and economic
systems across the Atlantic. In both systems, rights in land in the new world began
with grants from the crown. Yet there the similarities ended. The Spanish empire
lodged these rights in a system of privilege based on personal and corporate connection
to the crown. In contrast, the British system lodged rights in a what became system of
transferable titles enforced by the judiciary. The foundation of the Spanish system was
political exchange, whereby elites gained rights and privileges by virtue of sustained
loyalty and support for the crown. Given the powers and constraints on the absolutist
crown, the political exchange of rights for political support helped ensure the crowns
long term survival.
A deeper root of the sharp contrast between the above institutions may be the di¤erent
levels of inequality in the initial endowment, where the greater disparity in resources is
more likely to result in elite ruling. Indeed, the large plantation agriculture and slavery
in mining in Latin America induce huge disparities in wealth. Even in todays Brazil,
for example, the richest 1 percent of the population controls 13 percent of the nations
wealth, while the poorest 50 percent controls only 13 percent (Santiso 2006, p. 134).
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In contrast, commodities were grown on family farms in North America where it exhibits
relative equality in land endowment. Consequently, these societies allocate political power
di¤erently:
... the United States and Canada were the clear leaders in doing away with restric-
tions based on wealth and literacy and introducing the secret ballot, and much higher
fractions of the populations voted in these countries than anywhere else in the Americas.
These societies were distinguished for their relative equality, population homogeneity,
and scarcity of labor, and it is notable that others of British heritage, such as Barba-
dos, generally retained stringent restrictions on the franchise well into the 20th century.
Moreover, it is striking that the leaders in extending the su¤rage in South and Central
America, such as Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica, are generally regarded as having
been historically the most egalitarian of Latin American societies, and having initial
factor endowments most closely resembling those of the United States and Canada.
(Engerman and Sokolo¤ 2001)
In terms of the model, Latin America countries have both personalistic culture and high
inequality of endowment, which mutually reinforce each other in a vicious circle. Actually
the endowment inequality plus elite ruling is the real malicious element, which not only
blocks the social optimal legal development but also lowers the social welfare. In contrast,
the personalistic culture may slow down the legal development but not necessarily reduce
the overall welfare. This result is consistent with experiences of East Asian countries, which
have impersonal resource allocation policies to increase social mobility and hence break the
trap of underdevelopment. For example, in Japan,
social status and income earning potential are allocated through the educational
system, and entry into the top public schools is determined solely by impersonal ex-
aminations. Neither political pull nor nancial contributions have any direct inuence
on this most important of resources ... Equally important, entry into elite levels of the
bureaucracy can only be accomplished through impersonal examinations. Thus, one
pillar of power and inuence over policymaking is allocated independently of personal
networks.(Reed 2001)
So a society can still achieve economic development while maintaining its culture prefer-
ence for loyalty in personal relationship, but it has to get rid of elite ruling and the associated
rigid resource allocation rules that protect the privileges of elites. In other words, bad po-
litical institutions are more powerful in blocking e¢ cient contract enforcement institutions.
On the other hand, since the cultural preference for stable personalistic relations tends to
17
decrease over time as the legal quality improves (Greif 1997), rigidly imposing traditional
cultural values may also hinder economic and legal development.
The following graph shows some preliminary empirical evidence consistent with the main
results of the model, where the data are from Botero et al. (2004). The legal quality is
indicated by Log number of days to start a business,which is the natural logarithm of
the number of days required to obtain legal status to operate a rm in 1999. Its level is the
highest, and hence the legal quality is lowest in Latin America. The second highest level is in
East Asia, followed closely by western countries, where those with the common law tradition,
which arguably has the most individualistic culture, require the shortest time to start a
business. As expected, the same ranking applies to the Size of the uno¢ cial economyas
a percentage of GDP, which is about 41.4% in Latin America, more than two times as large
as the others. This order is completely reversed for the degree of institutionalized democracy
during 1950-1995 and the average schooling level, which may reect the extent of elite ruling
and social mobility. The per capital GNP is the lowest in the Latin America, while those
of others are much higher and similar to each other. The average Gini index (not shown)
is around 32-36 for both West and East Asian groups, while it is 51.4 in Latin America,
which has almost the highest income inequality among all countries (United Nations 2005).
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5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the interactions between relational and impersonal contract enforce-
ment institutions and their dynamic evolution. The personalistic relationship and a cultural
taste for it can be compatible to economic development, though their prevalence is reduced
when the legal quality improves. The elite ruling and low social mobility, however, present
a large barrier for legal development and e¢ cient contract enforcement. An even deeper
root is the allocation of factor endowment, where more equal distribution may be the ulti-
mate cure for most illness in a stagnant society. Though casual evidence o¤ers some initial
support, the empirical validity of these results needs to be tested more extensively in future
research.
The paper can be extended in various ways. For example, it is interesting to model
investment decisions that improve the quality of relationships, increasing either its produc-
tivity or the likelihood that established relationships remain productive; it seems plausible
that a higher legal quality shifts resources from maintaining old matches to improving the
productivity of new ones, which may speed up technological changes. The roles of multilat-
eral networks and information transmission and punishment mechanisms may be explored
to shed light on di¤erent features of relational contracts than those discussed in the pa-
per. The coercive constraint institutions as suggested by Greif (2005) may present another
barrier in legal development and in the transition of contract enforcement institutions.
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Appendix
1. Proof for Lemma 1.
Recall that in any informal relational contract the matched partners do not start to
cooperate until after the Nth period. When the match is still fresh in any period n 
N + 1, the value of such an established persistent relationship IP at period n is VP : In
any period n < N , the value of continuing the relationship when the match is still fresh is
Vn = [Vn+1 + (1  )l]: Then the value at the initial period of a relationship is
V0;N =
()Na+ (1  )l
1   : (13)
In any period n  N + 1 when the match is still fresh, agents will not cheat if the
payo¤ of cheating b + V0;N is smaller than VP , the payo¤ of cooperation. The condition
b+ V0;N  VP determines the minimum number of periods, N , that players have to stick
to each other before cooperation starts:
()N =
a+ (1  )l   b(1  )
a
: (14)
Suppose without loss of generality all persistent relationships go through exactly N periods
before cooperating. Plugging (14) into (13) we get
V0P =
a  b(1  ) + (1  )l
(1  ) ; (15)
which is the value of a new match adopting IP.10
A persistent relationship will continue even when the match goes stale. Doing so is
rational when it yields a higher payo¤ than starting a new relationship. That is, l  V0P
must hold, which is equivalent to l  a b(1 )  l: Then V0P can be rewritten as V0P =
l+(1 )l
1  ; where minfV0P : l  lg = l: The gap between VP and V0P is
cIP  VP   V0P = a  l   (1  )l
1   ;
which represents the relationship-building cost. Its highest level is cIP (l = l) = b a .
10The integer problem on the minimum number of noncooperative periods is assumed away; otherwise
some minor quantitative adjustment is needed, which will not change the qualitative results.
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Following similar arguments as above we get the following conditions for IG.
VIG = a+ (VIG + (1  )V0G)) VIG = a+ (1  )V0G
1   :
VnG = [Vn+1;G + (1  )V0G]) V0G = ()
Na+ (1  )V0G
1   ) V0G =
()Na
1   :
b  VIG   V0G = (1  ()
N )a+ (1  )()Na
1   ) a()
N =
a  b(1  )

= l
) V0G = a  b(1  )
(1  ) = l
) VIG = a+ (1  )l
1   :
cIG  VIG   V0G = a  l
1   =
b  a

:
Since conditions (3) and (5) imply V0P R V0G when l R l, we get the result.
2. Proof for Lemma 2.
(1) FG. We rst study the legal contract FG leading to a good-weather relationship.
Suppose an unmatched player obtains a value WG while a matched player in is VG. On the
equilibrium path of a good-weather relationship where players cooperate immediately when
they meet, VG   c = WG. That is, once they spend cost c to write an e¤ective contract
to forbid cheating, each player can obtain a value of VG. When players cooperate, they
get a immediately, followed by a continuation value VG with probability  and WG with
probability 1  : That is VG = a+ (VG + (1  )WG); which with WG = VG   c gives
VG =
a  (1  )c
1   ;
WG =
a  (1  )c
1   :
Lets check the possible one-shot deviation. In a new match, if a player cheats he gets
payo¤ b(1 Q(c; q)) + WG   c, where the rst term is his expected current payo¤, and in
the next period he will start as an unmatched player with payo¤ WG since his partner will
break up the partnership. If he cooperates, the match will continue where he gets VG   c.
Cheating will not happen when
b(1 Q(c; q))  VG   WG;
which becomes bQ(c; q) + c  b  a after plugging in VG and WG. Dene cG to make the
equality hold and we get condition (7): bQ(cG; q) + cG = b   a: Since players will not
cheat when c  cG, cG is the minimum cost to use FG.
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Another condition is that it must be desirable to break up a match when it becomes
stale. That is l  WG should hold, which is l  a   (1   )c: When the equality holds,
we get cS = a l1  as the threshold legal cost, above which players will not break up a
stale match. So good-weather relationships are feasible when c 2 [cG; cS ]. Note that cG is
independent of l while cS decreases in l. This implies when players adopt a good-weather
relationship, cG  cS must be true, or equivalently
l  a  (1  )cG  lG
holds, where cG = cS when l = lG: So in a given legal system, only projects with low l  lG
will adopt good-weather relationship.
(2) FP. The value of an established match in FP is VP , while an unmatched player gets
WP = VP   c. A player will not cheat if b(1 Q(c; q))  VP   WP : It is simplied to
bQ(c; q) + c  b  (1  )a+ (1  )l
1   ;
where the equality holds when c = cP , which is the minimum cost to use FP. Note that the
right hand side is exactly cIP , which can also be connected to cS :
bQ(cP ; q) + cP = cIP = b  a+ (1  )cS :
The condition WP  l is equivalent to c  cS . So players prefer FP when c  maxfcP ; cSg.
(3) The cost conditions can be related in the following way:
bQ(cP ; q) + (cP   cS) + cS = b  a = bQ(cG; q) + cG:
When cP = cS ; condition (8) is exactly the same as (7), which means cP = cG: But then
cP = cG = cS must hold, which happens only when l = lG since cG = cS holds at l = lG.
The above condition can be rewritten as
b(Q(cG; q) Q(cP ; q)) + (cG   cP ) = (1  )(cP   cS):
When cP > cS ; we must simultaneously have cG > cP > cS , where cG > cS happens only
when l > lG. Similarly, if cP < cS ; we must simultaneously have cG < cP < cS and l < lG:
@cG
@q < 0 and
@cP
@q < 0 since
@cG
@q
=   bQq(cG; q)
bQc(cG; q) + 
< 0;
@cP
@q
=   bQq(cP ; q)
bQc(cP ; q) + 
< 0:
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When l  lG we know cG > cP from the analysis above. But this, together with Qqc  0;
Qcc  0; and  < 1; implies  @cG@q >  @cP@q :
@2cG
@q2
=  bQqq(bQc + )  b
2Qq(Qcq +Qcc@cG=@q)
(bQc + )2
> 0;
@2cP
@q2
=  bQqq(cP ; q)(bQc + )  b
2Qq(cP ; q)(Qcq +Qcc@cP =@q)
(bQc + )2
> 0:
lG is increasing and concave in q since
@lG
@q
= (1  ) @cG
@q
> 0:
@2lG
@q2
=  (1  )@
2cG
@q2
< 0: (16)
Then this implies q is increasing and convex in lG.
When l > lG, only FP is an equilibrium since cG > cS : When l < lG, both FP and FG
are feasible since cG < cP < cS . Players either incur a cost cG to engage in FG, getting a
net value lG in (10), or incur a cost cS to have FP and get VP   cS = l: It is easy to see
that when l < lG; FG has a higher value than FP, and when l = lG players are indi¤erent.
3. Proof for Proposition 1.
1) q < q: When q < q and hence cG > b a , the corresponding threshold lG(q) is
denoted by llG < l. Players with l  llG < l strictly prefer IG to FG since V0G = l1  >
llG
1  = VG   cG: Those in the middle with l 2 (llG; l) have to compare V0G under IG with
VP   cP under FP, where V0G = l1  = (VP   cP )j(l=l;q=q) > (VP   cP )j(l<l;q<q) holds
since VP   cP increases in both l and q. So agents prefer IG to FP. When l > l > llG, we
have cP > cS > cIP so that IP is strictly preferred to FP. So when q < q, IG is chosen
when l < l and IP when l > l. Similar arguments apply to the case with q = q where
players are indi¤erent between IG and FG when l < l and still choose IP when l > l.
2) q > q: When q > q and hence cG < b a , the corresponding threshold lG(q) is
denoted by lhG > l. Players with l  l < lhG strictly prefer FG to IG since V0G = l1  <
lhG
1  = VG   cG. Players with l 2 [l; lhG] prefer FG to IP since V0P < VG   cG:
V0P <
a  b(1  ) + (1  )lhG
(1  ) <
lhG = VG   cG
, a  b(1  ) + (1  )lhG < (1  )lhG
, lhG >
a  (1  )b

= l:
So FG is chosen for any project l  lhG: Since cP (l; q) > cIP (l) holds for l > lh while the
opposite is true when l < lh, FP is chosen for l 2 [lG; lh] while IP for l 2 [lh; a].
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For any q > q, lh is an increasing and concave function of q since by (11)
@lh
@q
=
1  
1  
 @cP (lh; q)
@q
> 0;
@2lh
@q2
=  1  
1  
@2cP (lh; q)
@q2
< 0:
When q = q; cP = b a = cIP at l, so we get lh = l = lG. For any q > q, lh > lG is
equivalent to
 (1  )cP + b(1  )  (1  )a > a(1  )  (1  )(1  )cG
, (cG   cP ) + b  a  cG > 0;
where the last inequality comes from cP (l; q) < cG < b a for q > q and l > l
h
G:When l = a,
cIP =
(a l)
1  > 0; so when lh = a, cP (lh; q) = cIP (lh) > 0: In contrast, when lG = a; we
have cG = cP = cS = 0 and the legal quality must have reached the highest possible level.
4. Proof for Corollary 1.
Repeating the calculation in the basic model, we get
VP () =
a+ (1  )(l + )=(1  )
(1  ) ;
cIP () = b  a(1  ) + (1  )(l + )
(1  ) = bQ(cP ; q) + cP ;
cS() =
a  (l + )
1   ;
l() =
a  b(1  )

  ;
lG(q; ) = a  (1  )cG   ;
lh(q; ) = lh(q; 0)  :
 @2cP (q; l; )
@q@
=
(1  )
1   @(
 1
bQc(cP ; q) + 
)=@q =
(1  )
1  
Qcc(cP ; q)
bQc(cP ; q) + 
< 0:
The payo¤s and costs for good-weather matches remain the same as before.
5. Proof for Proposition 2.
The FOC illustrates the trade-o¤ between reduced costs in using legal contracts and the
marginal cost of improving legal quality:
(1  )
(1  ) F (lG;t+1)
 @cG;t+1
@qt+1
+
Z lh;t+1
lG;t+1
 @cP;t+1
@qt+1
dF (l) C1(qt+1; qt)k 1t  0; = 0 if qt+1 > q:
(17)
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Since C2(qt+1; qt) < 0 and kt increases over time, it is less costly to invest in legal system at
later times when both qt and kt are higher. Suppose the rst time the equality holds is T0,
and the associated optimal legal quality is qT0 > q
. Then for any t < T0, we have qt = 0.
Thus T0 is uniquely determined by
kT0 1 = [
(1  )F (lG;T0)
(1  )
 @cG;T0
@qT0
+
Z lh;T0
lG;T0
 @cP;T0
@qT0
dF (l)] 1C1(qT0 ; 0): (18)
Since  @cG@q >
 @cP
@q holds by Lemma 2, the marginal gain of improving legal quality
increases in F (lG;t+1): From (9) and (2) we get
lG;t+1 = l + (1  )(b  cG;t+1):
So the LHS in (17) increases in l, the proportion of projects using IG when qt  q. It
implies the optimal qt+1 is higher and T0 is lower when l is larger.
The LHS in the FOC (17) decreases in  since
@LHS
@
=
(1  )f(lG;t+1)
(1  )
@cG;t+1
@qt+1
  @cP;t+1
@qt+1
jlG;t+1f(lG;t+1)
 
Z lh;t+1
lG;t+1
@2cP;t+1
@qt+1@
dF (l) +
@cP;t+1
@qt+1
jlh;t+1f(lh;t+1)
 (1  )f(lG;t+1)
(1  )
@cG;t+1
@qt+1
jlG;t+1  
Z lh;t+1
lG;t+1
@2cP;t+1
@qt+1@
dF (l) +
@cP;t+1
@qt+1
jlh;t+1f(lh;t+1) < 0;
where the rst inequality is got by @cG;t+1@qt+1 
@cP;t+1
@qt+1
jlG;t+1 < 0; and the second inequality
also by @
2cP;t+1
@qt+1@
> 0: So we have
@qt+1
@
=  @LHS
@
=SOC < 0;
that is, the optimal legal quality is lower when  is higher. Similarly, since the marginal
gain of improving legal system decreases in , the investment in legal system starts later.
Furthermore, in each period the legal quality is also lower not only because  is higher, but
also because the previous legal quality is also lower.
6. Proof for Proposition 3.
The FOC is 0FP (q
E
t+1) + 
0
IP (q
E
t+1)   C1(qt+1; qt)k 1t  0: Since the marginal gain is
smaller than that in the mobile society, the optimal choice qEt+1 is lower than q

t+1 at any
period t  T0E . The rst period the equality holds is T0E , which is uniquely determined by
kT0E 1 = [
0
FP (q
E
T0E
) + 0IP (q
E
T0E
)] 1C1(qT0E ; 0):
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It is easy to check T0E > T0. If qET0E < q

T0
, then T0E > T0 is true since
kT0E 1 > [
0
FP (q

T0) + 
0
IP (q

T0)]
 1C1(qT0 ; 0)
> [0FG(q

T0) + 
0
FP (q

T0) + 
0
IP (q

T0)]
 1C1(qT0 ; 0) = kT0 1:
If qET0E  qT0 , then qET0E must be achieved at some later time T 00 than T0 in the mobile
society, where T 00 < T0E holds since
kT 00 1 = [
0
FG(q
E
T0E
) + 0FP (q
E
T0E
) + 0IP (q
E
T0E
)] 1C1(qET0E ; 0)
< [0FP (q
E
T0E
) + 0IP (q
E
T0E
)] 1C1(qET0E ; 0) = kT0E 1:
So T0E > T 00 > T0 is true. Again T0E > T0 holds.
7. Proof for Proposition 4.
(1) When qt+1  q; the elites use IP while others IG so that V (le;t) = V0P (le;t) and
E(Vt+1) = V 
Z a
l
V0PdF (l) + V0GF (l)
=
l(1  F (l))
(1  ) +
(1  )
(1  )(1  )
Z a
le
ldF (l) +
lF (l)
1   :
Then (12) becomes V0P (le;t) = V , which boils down to
le;t = le  lF (l) +
Z a
l
ldF (l):
Based on this equation we get
@le
@
=  F (l)  lf(l) + lf(l) =  F (l) < 0:
The elite has higher economic power than others whenZ a
le
V0PdF (l) 
Z le
l
V0PdF (l)  V0GF (l)  0,
Z a
le
V0PdF (l)  1
2
V  0
holds, where
R a
le
V0PdF (l) =
l(1 F (le))
(1 ) +
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
R a
le
ldF (l): This condition implies that,
for two societies with the same mean V , the one with a higher inequality in l distribution
(where
R a
le
ldF (l) is higher) has a higher probability of elite ruling. The LHS of the above
inequality increases in  because
@LHS
@
=
Z a
le
@V0P
@
dF (l) 
Z le
l
@V0P
@
dF (l) + 2V0P (le)f(le)
=
(1  )
(1  )(1  ) [1  2F (le) + F (l)] + 2V0P (le)f(le) > 0;
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where the second equality holds due to @V0P@ =
(1 )
(1 )(1 ) ; and the inequality holds when
1  2F (le) + F (l) > 0, which is true under broad conditions.
(2) When qt+1 > q; we assume w.l.o.g. le;t  lh;t+1 so that the elites include players
whose children use both IP and FP. Then le;t is uniquely determined by
VP (le;t)  cP (le;t; qEt+1) = FG(qt+1) + FP (qt+1) + IP (qt+1);
where the LHS strictly increases in le;t while the RHS is independent of it. By the implicit
function theorem
@le;t
@
=  @(VP;t+1   cP;t+1)=@  @E(Vt+1)=@
@[VP (le;t)  cP;t+1)]=@le;t < 0;
since
@E(Vt+1)
@
=
Z a
lG;t+1
@(VP;t+1   cIP;t+1)
@
dF (l) +
Z lh;t+1
lG;t+1
@cIP;t+1   @cP;t+1
@
dF (l)
<
@(VP;t+1   cIP;t+1)
@
due to 1  F (lG;t+1) < 1 and @cIP;t+1 @cP;t+1@ = bQc
@cP;t+1
@ +
bQq

@qt+1
@ < 0:
The elites have dominant economic power when
R lh;t+1
le;t
(VP   cP;t+1)dF (l) +
R a
lh;t+1
(VP  
cIP )dF (l)  12E(Vt+1), which isZ a
lh;t+1
(VP cIP )dF (l)+
Z lh;t+1
le;t
(VP cP;t+1)dF (l) 
Z le;t
lG;t+1
(VP cP;t+1)dF (l) F (lG;t+1)(VG cG;t+1)  0:
Again the LHS increases in  since
@LHS
@
=
Z a
lh;t+1
@(VP   cIP;t+1)
@
dF (l) +
Z lh;t+1
le;t
@(VP   cP;t+1)
@
dF (l)
 
Z le;t
lG;t+1
@(VP   cP;t+1)
@
dF (l)  2f(le;t)(VP   cP;t+1)@le;t
@
 [1  2F (le;t) + F (lG;t+1)]@(VP   cP;t+1)
@
jle;t   2f(le;t)(VP   cP;t+1)
@le;t
@
> 0;
given that @V0P;t+1@t+1 is independent of l while
@(VP cP;t+1)
@ decreases in l,
@le;t
@ < 0; and when
1  2F (le;t) + F (lG;t+1)  0 is true, which holds under broad conditions.
The LHS decreases in qt whenZ lh;t+1
le;t
 @cP;t+1
@qt
dF (l) < [F (lh;t+1)  F (le;t)]
 @cP (le;t; qEt+1)
@qt
<
1
2
@E(Vt+1)
@qt
holds, where the rst inequality holds because  @cP;t+1@qt+1 decreases in l. Since F (lh;t+1) < 1 <
1
2+F (le;t), a su¢ cient condition for the second inequality to hold is
 @cP (le;t;qEt+1)
@qt
 @E(Vt+1)@qt
where the average gain from a higher legal quality is larger than that of the bottom elite
player with le;t, which is true under broad conditions.
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